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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the relative importance of the major factors
underlying the post—1978 increase in China's agricultural productivity. We
present a method for assessing the role of price increases and strengthened
individual incentives due to the introduction of the responsibility system.
Data on pre- and post—1978 Chinese agricultural performance are used to
calculate incentive indices, giving the fraction of their marginal product


















CANADA N6A 5C21. Introduction
Between 1978 and 1984 output in the Chinese agricultural sector
increased by over 50 percent (Johnson 1985). These impressive output gains
followed the adoption of a system stressing individual responsibility in place
of a system of communal decision—making and rewards. The ongoing economic
reform in China has attracted much attention in the West, in part because it
represents a major social experiment in the design of institutions in which a
system emphasizing ideology and social sanctions has been replaced by a system
relying more heavily on economic incentives. However, not all the increase in
Chinese agricultural output can be attributed to systemic changes, because at
the same time, the prices of agricultural outputs and the use of inputs such
as chemical fertilizers were increased.'
This paper presents a method for decomposing the productivity increase
in Chinese agriculture in the post—1978 period into that part attributable to
price increases and that part which reflects the effects of strengthened
individual incentives under the new institutional structure. Our method
combines standard growth—accounting techniques with a simple model of
peasants' rational response to the institution within which they work.
Subject to caveats both about the special functional forms assumed in our
calculations and the shortcomings of the available data, we suggest that
three—quarters of the 37 percent increase in agricultural productivity in
China between 1978 and 1984 can be attributed to the incentive effects of the
new responsibility system and one—quarter to higher prices. We also obtain a
measure of the extent to which individual incentives operated under pre—1978
communal system: our calculations suggest that it was as if peasants2
were paid one-third of their marginal value product. As a result, we estimate
that the effective quality of labor under the commune system was about 60 per
cent of that under the responsibility system.
These findings have wider implications than simply providing an
understanding of performance in Chinese agriculture. Much of modern
microeconomic theory focuses on the design of institutions;2 and Chinese
policy is an experiment in institutional design on a huge scale. In the
theorists' analyses, it is individuals' self—interested responses which
constrain institutional design. In this paper, we use the results of the
Chinese experiment to estimate empirically the force of incentive
constraints. Our results suggest that rewarding individual effort yields
large benefits. Hence, for other countries where communal methods have been
tried and agricultural performance has been poor (such as Tanzania), these
results suggest that prices and institutions need to be considered together as
explanations of performance. The results also suggest that significant
further gains could be achieved by comparable reforms in the Chinese
industrial sector, allowing pice incentives to operate more freely than has
hitherto been the case.
In Section 2 we briefly describe Chinese agricultural arrangements
before and after 1978. Section 3 presents the theory underlying our
decomposition method for estimating the relative importance of institutional
changes and price changes for economic performance. Section 4 presents data
on total factor productivity changes, our decomposition, and estimated
incentive indices. Section 5 offers a conclusion.3
2. Institutional Arrangements in Chinese Agriculture
A typical Chinese rural commune in 1978 consisted of three units:the
commune, the production brigade, and the production team. The production team
was the basic accounting and production—organizing unit. It owned virtually
all the land, draft animals and farm machinery it used. Each teamwas given
annual production targets (conveyed through the commune and brigade). Itthen
drew up its annual production plan, deciding how to use its land,manpower,
animals, and farm tools; when to plow and plant, and what types of fertilizer
to use for which kinds of crops. All peasants, including women andchildren,
were included in the team's labor plan.
There were two principal methods of allocating workamong team members;
assigning work on a daily basis, or assigning long—term fixed work. In grain
production and other major farm tasks, work was assigned to workgroups on a
rotating basis. For other tasks, work was given to small groups of peasants
who often retained a permanent responsibility for the job.
Each production team distributed income among team members largely
according to an estimate of each member's labor contribution to production.
Under the "labor—day—work—payment" system, the quantity of work donewas
measured in terms of labor days. For each day, those who presented themselves
in the field would receive a labor day. The quality of work donewas measured
by work points received per labor day. Members of teams were classified into
different grades according to their technical skills, capacity towork, and
how well they met the labor norms set up by the team. Different numbers of
work points were attached to each grade. Members periodically assessed each
other's work and determined the grade each should be classified into, and thus
the number of work points each should earn for labor days workedduring the
period of assessment. In this assessment process, team staff (team leaders
and heads of work groups) played the main role.4
At the end of the agricultural year, the combined income of the team was
divided by the sumofwork points credited to all team members to determine
the value of one work point. The disposable income of each member was
determined by multiplying by the number of work points the individual peasant
had accumulated over the agricultural year.3
At the end of 1978, the Chinese central government decided to introduce
major reform in agriculture in large part because of poor agricultural growth
performance over the preceding 20 year period. A "production responsibility
system" was introduced to deal with the problems of shirking and mismanagement
associated with the previous communal system. Under this, the individual
peasant, rather than the production team, became the basic unit for
decision—making in Chinese agriculture. Most aspects of collective management
have since been abandoned, with only land ownership remaining within the
collective (Lardy (1986a, 1986b), Watson (1984)). Introduction of this system
began in 1979, and by the end of 1983 more than 90 percent of farm families
operated under the responsibility system (Crook (1985)).
The responsibility system involves contracts signed between the
production team and each household, which regulate the taxes and delivery
quotas payable to the state and the welfare funds and investment funds payable
to the team. Any production above the delivery quota is retained by the
household who can sell it and receive the proceeds. Most restrictions on
production activities on private plots have been removed and the size of
private plots has increased.5
The earlier grain self—sufficiency policy, which required each region to
be self—sufficient in grain production, has also been abandoned. Peasants in
each region are now allowed to specialize in planting these crops most
suitable to their land, rainfall, temperature, and other environmental
characteristics. The number of planned product categories and obligatory
targets has been sharply reduced. In addition, control over collective
production activities have been relaxed and production teams can organize any
non—farm production as they see fit.
In addition to these changes, reforms in agricultural prices have
occurred. Since 1979, state procurement prices have increased for most major
farm products. Grain procurement prices have increased by 20 percent for
compulsory delivery quotas, and the additional price premium for above-quota
sales has been raised from 30 percent to 50 percent (Kueh, 1984).
Furthermore, any extra grain produced can be sold at prices reflecting
conditions in the open market, and substantial procurement price increases for
other farm products have occurred. Comparable procurement and premium prices
for cotton have been raised by 15 percent and 30 percent, respectively, and
compulsory delivery prices for edible oil and pork have been increased by 25
percent (Kueb, 1984). Prices of tobacco, vegetables and soy beans have also
been raised (Walker, 1984), and prices of some manufactured goods supplied to
the agricultural sector have been reduced.
3. Decomposing the Effects of Price Increases and Changes in the
Incentive System
The net effect of all these changes has been a sharp increase in output
in Chinese agriculture.4 However, assessing their importance of each is
difficult because they have occurred largely simultaneously. While it has
been the systemic changes involving the responsibility system which have
attracted most attention, thus far it has not been clear what portion of the
output gain to attribute to them, given the price increases.6
Our procedure to make such a decomposition is based on growth—accounting
techniques associated with Dennison (1967) and Solow (1957), but goes further
in also incorporating behavioral responses of agricultural workers to changes
in both the incentive system and prices. Since we seek an
empirically—implementable model, we assume special functional forms in our
analysis.
We assume that a peasant can choose the efficiency with which he works.
If L represents the total number of peasants and c is the effort of a typical
worker, the contribution of labor to output measured in efficiency units is
Lc. This approach to representing the labor input in agricultural production
is similar to that underlined Stiglitz's (1976) efficiency—wage hypothesis:
but unlike Stiglitz, we model the individual's optimizing choice of effort.
Although we describe c as "effort", it should be interpreted broadly, to
include everything that determines the effective quality of labor: c might
be increased not only by inducing the workers literally to exert more effort,
but also by encouraging the use of entrepreneurial talent, or by removing
restrictions on the kinds of tasks a worker may undertake and thereby allowing
labor to flow to its most productive uses.
We assume a Cobb—Douglas agricultural production function, given by
a 1-a
1 1
Q =a(cL) K , (1) 0
where QandK represent total output and aggregate non-labor inputs (capital,
land, pesticides, fertilizer, etc.) respectively, anda1 defines the share
parameters on factor inputs (0 < a1 < 1). The quantity produced by a
representative peasant is thus7
a
1 1 q=ac k , (2) 0
where q and k represent output per peasant and capitalper peasant
respectively.
We suppose that each peasant receives an income which dependson his
productivity and is given by
y=13pq+c, (3)
where p is the price at which additional output is sold;q is the quantity of
output produced by the peasant; 13isthe fraction of the additional revenue
generated that the peasant is allowed to keep; and c is a constant term.
Under the post—1979 responsibility system, c is negative(representing
the output quota that the peasant must deliver to the government) and
13= 1
(the peasant keeps the proceeds of sales of output beyond his quota).5Under
the pre—1979 communal system, c is positive (the payment receivedby the
peasant regardless of his own effort) and 0 <13<1,since peasants were
typically not fully rewarded for effort at the margin, due to the reward
structure in the commune. A commonly—made observation is thatmanagerial
difficulties in operating the communes gave rise to "the problem that
individuals (in the commune) could see little connection between effort
expended and what they received as income" (Macrae (1977, p. 371)). Itwas
difficult to measure an individual's effort accurately; and tosome extent the
distribution of rewards within the commune was based on egalitarian criteria:
Johnson (1985), Watson (1984). But priori, our analysis does not ruleout the
possibility that those problems were overcome by the communemanagers, i.e.
13 =1.While equation (3) does not fully model all the complexities of8
payment under the work—points system, it nonetheless captures its main
features.6 The parameteris an index of the strength of the incentives
offered to peasants: it measures the peasant's perception of what fraction of
his marginal value product he would be paid.
We also assume that peasants receive utility from income but dislike





where 6 >0and z >1are constants. This function implies that the
marginal disutility of effort, c1/6, increases with effort. Without this
property, there would be a corner solution for the optimal effort level from
peasant optimizing behavior. The work—disutility coefficient z is such that
2 2
c3 u/ac
z—l = . (5) au/ac
Thus, analogous to the coefficient of relative risk aversion, z measures the
curvature of the utility function. The utility function (4) also implies that
the disutility of effort is independent of income level.
We now consider the peasant's optimizing choice of effort. Substitution
of (2) and (3) into (4) and optimization with respect to c implies that the
optimal effort c satisfies
=[6a (6) 10
Substitution of this into the per—worker production function (2) gives
q = [6a3p] 1/(z_a1)kz(l_cl)/(z_l) (7) 0 109










A = [6a (3p1 . (9) 0 10
We label (8) the "institutional" production function to distinguish it from
"technical" production function (1). The difference is that while (1)
reflects technical (that is, biological and physical) relationships between
inputs and outputs, (8) also incorporates the peasants' response to the
institutional arrangements within which they work.7
We note that the institutional production function (8) is expressed in
terms of the observable labor input L rather than the unobservable efficiency
measure of labor cL, as in the technical production function. It is (8)
rather than (1) that would be estimated by the conventional
aggregate-production--function estimation; and the estimated factor shares
would be and 2' rather than those of the technical production
relationship, and A would be the term estimated as total factor
productivity.
The parameters ct, l' and are technologically determined, and 6
and z are taste parameters: all are invariant to the institutional form. The
two policy variables are the output price, p. and the share of the peasant's
marginal output that he retains, f3.The sole effect of a change in either or
both of these policy variables is to change the coefficient A in the
institutional production function (8). We can thus assess the effect of
changes in 3 (as through the introduction of the responsibility system) on10
agricultural productivity for unchanged agricultural prices, and the effect of
changes in prices for unchanged 3, and in this way separate the two effects
in which we are interested.
Using the subscripts i and j to denote parameter and policy variables








Given price indices p. and p.,, total—factor—productivity estimates A. and A.,,
the labor—share exponent in production and an estimate of the
work—disutility parameter z, we can use (10) to compute the ratio of the
incentive indices 13.113.. Since 13. =1for marginal production under the 13 1
responsibility system, we can estimate f3. under the commune system. And




I I —=— , (11)
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3 3
which is what the ratio of total factor productivities would have been if
there had been no price changes; that is p. =p1.Thus (11) provides an
estimate of the extent to which observed productivity increases were caused by
the incentive effect of the institutional changes alone.
Finally, from (6) and the fact that =
y1z/(y1÷z—l),we have, for a




i ii —= , (12)
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showing the effective quality of labor in year i relative to year j, as a
function of the institutional arrangements (the 13. and 13.) and prices.
Our model ignores the possibility that the introduction of the
responsibility system may have affected not only the quality of labor, but
also the effective quality of land, especially to the extent that
decentralized decision—making results in a better matching of crops to land.
Also, the opening of new markets, by creating new gains from trade, may have
caused productivity growth. And, if technical progress occurs, total factor
productivity would increase (via a rise in the parameter a). Thus, to the
extent that any of these effects is at work, our model will overestimate the
relative efficiency of the responsibility system compared to the communal.
4. Measuring Incentive Effects
Equations (8) and (9) above imply that the effect of a change in the
institutional incentive system is to change the measured total factor
productivity, A.If we denote the responsibility system and the commune
system by subscripts i and j, respectively, then the ratio A./A. is equal to
the ratio of outputs under the two institutional arrangements for any given
input vector. It thus provides a measure of the productivity gain
attributable to the strengthened incentives under the responsibility system
and/or the increases in agricultural prices.12
To provide some background to our computations of post—1978 productivity
changes, Table 1 presents data on inputs and outputs for 1952 to 1977. In
1952 land redistribution had been accomplished andthepeasants farmed their
ownland:a market system operated. From the time of the collectivization,
1953, to the end of the Cultural Revolution the annual change in total factor
productivity was negative almost as often as it was positive. Productivity
fell drastically during the Great Leap Forward (see the 1959 and 1960
estimates) and during the Cultural Revolution (in particular in 1968). Only
in three years (1955, 1957, and 1958) was total factor productivity as high as
it had been in 1952. By 1961, after the Great Leap Forward, total factor
productivity was 74 percent of what it had been in 1952; and by 1977, it was
90 percent of the 1952 level.
Table 2 shows that the post—1978 situation has been strikingly
different, (Tables 1 and 2 are presented separately because the input and
output data series are noncomparable.7) In 1978 agricultural prices began to
increase; and through the early 1980s the production responsibility system was
introduced. These changes have resulted in successive increases in total
factor productivity, except for a slight, transitional decline in 1979—1980.
From equation (9), changes in 13 affect the productivity parameter A in
exactly the same way as changes in p: the incentive structure and prices are
perfect substitutes. However, prices are available in the data, whereas 13's
are not. Using equation (10), we can estimate the ratio of incentive indices
in different years, 13./IL. These incentive—index estimates use the














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































labor—share and utility—function parameters. Agricultural price indices are
reported in the last column of Table 2. The labor—share parameter we take to
be 0.50, following Tang (1980).8 We need also the unobservable parameterz,
which measures the curvature of the utility function. The only theoretical
restriction is that it must exceed one. Although not directly observable, z
can be calculated indirectly. Between 1978 and 1979, there were substantial
agricultural price increases (of 22 percent), but little change in the commune
system (Watson, 1984, p. 90). Assuming that from 1978 to 1979 13 was
unchanged, we can from (10) infer the value of z. This we compute to be
3.448, and we use this value for z in our other computations.
Table 3 reports estimates of the incentive—index ratio 13.113. in the
first row. If we presume that 13 =1in 1984 (peasants receive their full
marginal value product under the responsibility system), then the 1984
estimate in Table 3 implies that in 1978 13 was 0.30. In the commune system
as it was organized at the end of the Cultural Revolution, it was as if an
individual worker was paid just under one—third of his marginal value product.
Using equation (11) and the f3/13, estimates, we can also deduce the
incentive effects of the introduction of the responsibility system alone. The
results are also reported in Table 3. We calculate that if there had been no
price increase between 1978 and 1984, total factor productivity would have
increased by 27.55 percent, compared with the 37.00 percent that it actually
increased. This implies that 75 percent of the productivity gain in Chinese
agriculture between 1978 and 1984 can be attributed to the strengthened
individual incentives generated by the new institutions, and the remaining 25
percent to the price increases.916
Table 3:
Incentive Indices and Total Factor Productivity Change in Chinese Agriculture, 1979—84
980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Ratioof Incentive
Indices 13t'81978 a .000 0.910 1.044 1.244 1.655 3.387
Actual Total Factor
Productivity
(1978 =I00).b 104.10 103.37 107.30 111.27 118.62 137.00
Hypothetical Total Factor
Productivity A', Assuming
104.10 98.1 100.88 104.49 110.65 127.55
Footnotes to Table 3
a(mpUtodusingequation (10).
bComputed from Table 2.
cComputedusingequation (II).
d8y our choice of z t3I979 equals 131978, and so by assumptionallof The increase in
productivity in 1979—1978 is due to the price increase.17
Finally, using equation (12) to compute c1978/c1984, we find that the
effective quality of labor in 1978 was about 60 per cent of what it became in
1984.
Since f3 is calculated as a residual, it is sensitive to changes in
parameters. The least reliable of our parameter estimates is the
utility—function curvature parameter z. The z estimate we use is 3.448. If
instead z were 2.0, we would have estimated l9781984 to be 0.76; this
would have attributed 40 percent of the productivity gain to the changed
incentive scheme. If z were 3.0, these estimates would have been 0.41 and 69
percent respectively. If z were 4.0, they would have been 0.22 and 79
percent. Thus our estimates are sensitive to changes in the estimate of z;
but over a wide range of z values our model attributes most of the
productivity increase to the changed incentive structure.
5. Conclusion
This paper presents a method for assessing the relative importance of
price increases and strengthened individual incentives for increased
agricultural performance in China following the economic reforms introduced in
1978. We employ a production—function approach in which optimizing effort of
peasants is captured: peasant supply of effort increases as either the prices
of agricultural products or the fraction of their value marginal product they
receive increase. Subject to caveats about the structure of our theoretical
model and the shortcomings of the data, our results suggest that one—quarter18
of the increase in productivity in Chinese agriculture between 1978 and 1984
was due to higher prices, and three—quarters to changes in the incentive
scheme. We estimate that the incentive effect of the change from the pre—1978
communal system to the post—1978 responsibility system resulted in a 28 per
cent increase in total factor productivity in agriculture.19
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